THE FUTURE OF ADVOCACY

Local Ownership, Sustainability, and Grant-making

It seems intuitive that local governments and organizations should determine their own responses to health and development needs. Yet the reality is much different. Often oversimplified and misaligned with what it takes to sustain local leadership, neither past programming nor current political and funding realities support the imperative for local ownership.

This options brief builds on extensive consultations with local leaders, funders, and advocacy experts, literature review, and the 10-year experience of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Advance Family Planning (AFP) initiative¹ to answer three questions:

1. Why do donors promote local ownership of health and development programs?
2. What factors increase the sustainability of local leadership and the advocacy agenda?
3. Which funding mechanisms most promote local ownership and sustainability?

KEY POINTS

- Donors have long wanted to shift programs to local ownership. But the shift has been problematic. Programs are still largely donor-driven.

- Full local ownership is unlikely, but collaborative partnership of donors and local entities is a proven model that can both improve health and promote civil society.

- If donors expect sustained advocacy after their support ends, they need to support capacity building directly or through higher indirect cost allowances.

- Depending on their investment aims, donors can choose from four options for strengthening local capacity for partnership.

- A proposed model for strengthening local advocacy capacity worldwide envisions a global project, regional advocacy hubs, and networks of local NGOs.
This options brief examines these three interrelated questions: local ownership of the development enterprise, sustainability, and granting instruments. In each of these sections, we outline options and suggest how donors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and governments can adopt approaches to assistance that better support local ownership of health, development, and human rights advocacy. We focus on family planning and reproductive health and rights in low- and middle-income countries, but these findings and conclusions also apply to other health sectors and to development in general.

This brief aims to start a conversation that will transform long-standing aspirations for civil society engagement into concrete ways that locally driven advocacy can contribute to progress. Our primary audience is donors.

1. LOCAL OWNERSHIP

Development assistance has been largely donor-driven. Although national governments and, occasionally, local NGOs are consulted, donors have the last word on how their funds are spent. In the area of global health, this approach has dramatically reduced mortality and fertility. Despite this success, many in the development community are philosophically uncomfortable that recipient countries and organizations do not have a greater voice in their development future. Also, they argue that giving recipients greater agency would improve the effectiveness of donor investments. In both the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, major donors agreed to make local ownership the centerpiece of a new assistance model. Most public discussion about local ownership refers to national governments, but the concept applies equally to local NGOs, the focus of this brief.²

Local ownership is promoted based on the following assumptions:

- Local people are more sensitive to political and cultural challenges and will understand what should be done and how to do it better than external donors;
- Local organizations are more likely to participate in the program;
- Direct funding to NGOs will be more efficient than channeling funds through an intermediary; and
- Locally owned programs are more likely to continue.

Despite donor commitment to local ownership, the shift has been problematic. Development assistance remains largely donor-driven, and the field is still awaiting the anticipated benefits of local ownership. Unpacking the elements of local ownership helps explain why it is difficult to achieve.
WHAT IS LOCAL OWNERSHIP?

To have local ownership, a country or organization must own (1) its development priorities, (2) the implementation of development programs, and (3) the financing of its development programs. Proponents of local ownership try to design their assistance to promote these three components.

PRIORITIES: Achieving local ownership of priorities in a donor-recipient relationship is difficult. Complete local ownership of development priorities would mean that donor assistance aligns with country or recipient organization priorities. This is unlikely, especially in the advocacy realm, which, intrinsically, aims to get something done that is not being done or to get it done differently. More typically, donors and recipients agree on actions that they both feel are important, even though these actions may not be either’s first choice. Global initiatives can help by identifying mutually compatible priorities. The FP2020 commitments of donors and developing countries in London, and more recently in Nairobi, are often vague, but they do provide a space to identify objectives that donors and recipients can comfortably work on together. However, having a common FP2020 type of objective does not mean that agreeing on a program or an approach to the problem will be easy.

In general, the more dependent a country or organization is on donor support, the more likely that it will defer to a donor’s priorities. Donors do not always get their way, however. The amount of funds may not be enough to sway the recipient, or the donor’s preference may conflict with the country’s politics or socio-cultural beliefs. Or the donor may make compromises out of a desire to work in a geography under the recipient’s influence.

Indeed, donor values and missions often are fundamentally incompatible with those of potential recipients. For example, donors who champion LGBTQ rights know that finding, say, Ugandan officials or local NGOs willing to accept a grant on these issues is highly unlikely. So, they do not even try. This self-policing by donors is pragmatic and common.

At the same time, however, donors may consider a priority so important that they bypass or overcome resistance in the host country. Thus, donor-driven initiatives on topics initially considered off-limits have eventually been accepted by countries. For example, in the 1970s many sub-Saharan African countries had anti-family planning policies. Donors and UNFPA convinced governments to change policies and begin to support family planning services, primarily through international NGOs (INGOs). Today, all sub-Saharan African countries have family planning programs. Similarly, in the early days of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, donors found many host country governments unwilling to mount HIV/AIDS prevention programs, and so donors turned to like-minded NGOs. If donors had funded only what recipients considered priorities, the gains realized in global health, and especially reproductive health, would be much more modest today.
IMPLEMENTATION: Ownership of implementation encompasses not only the programmatic strategies and tactics used to address a development problem, but also local control over implementors and the evaluation or tracking of the development enterprise. Of local ownership’s three components, implementation has made the most progress. Today, virtually all implementation is led by local professionals much more knowledgeable about how best to address a problem and involve local communities than expats were in the past. Virtually all INGO country offices are led and staffed by nationals. Multilateral and bilateral donor missions rely heavily on the expertise of their indigenous staffs. While there is definite progress in the area, donors still need to help countries increase their implementation wherewithal on the path to ownership.

A common, multidimensional problem is that many indigenous NGOs and national and local organizations lack the human and organizational capacity for stewardship of development programs. There are shortages of people who can carry out such necessary tasks as developing workplans, budgets, accounting, and progress reports. Even less common are communication and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) skills, particularly where English is not the first language but is the lingua franca of the development community. The few individuals with such abilities are enthusiastically recruited by the private sector, INGOs and multilateral and bilateral missions. Additionally, many NGOs and government units lack adequate telecommunication, computer, and transportation capabilities. While funding could alleviate these shortcomings, typically donors are not generous supporters of capacity building. In summary, while INGO country offices and a few large local NGOs have implementation capacity, many governmental units and most local NGOs require infusions of resources, including technical assistance, to build up their competence.

FINANCING: There are several possible levels of ownership of financing. The ideal objective is the end of external funding (see section below on sustainability). This is unrealistic for virtually all NGOs in low-income countries. Another option is that donors give recipients fiduciary control over funds—essentially making a gift. More pragmatic and realistic ownership would entail donor and recipient reaching an agreement that gives the recipient greater discretion on how the money is spent, develops a cost-sharing arrangement, and/or provides technical assistance in raising funds through fees for services, loans, private donations, or grants from other donors. These arrangements may make the organization less donor-dependent, but not donor-independent.

LOCAL OWNERSHIP EXPERIENCE

There have been few evaluations of attempts to promote local ownership. Two exceptions are from USAID. The United States has invested heavily in promoting local ownership, through the 2005 $200 million New Partners Initiative (NPI) and the 2010 USAID Forward “local solutions” agenda, which aimed to have 30 percent of its funds go directly to local organizations. Although the Agency fell short of this target, it did obligate $2.6 billion to 1,150 local organizations over a 10-year period.\(^3\,^5\)
These efforts had mixed results. The issues confounding these two local ownership initiatives have been common in similar, smaller efforts. They can be divided into recipient issues and donor issues.

**RECIPIENT ISSUES:** Limited capacity to plan, implement, and document activities handicapped many local organizations’ ownership aspirations. Typically, recipients are financially strapped, with little reserve or discretionary funds, while donor funds are earmarked for project activities. While donors encourage local ownership, what constitutes local ownership and how to achieve it are not always clear to either party. Local organizations’ unfamiliarity with donor–recipient working relationships is also a challenge. Some local organizations receive donor support for many years, but funds are usually channeled through an intermediary, typically an INGO, which provides technical assistance and managerial and fiduciary support. Thus, although these local organizations are experienced in implementing donor programs, they are inexperienced in working directly with donors.

**DONOR ISSUES:** Overall, donors do not have a clear theory of change for achieving local ownership. The purpose of local ownership is not clear, and its link to desired project outcomes is tenuous. Donors are usually aware of recipients’ limited capacity. Still, they hesitate to modify such things as reporting requirements and monitoring even though these are beyond the local organization’s capacity. Donors are especially resistant to modifying their fiduciary reporting requirements, as the potential risk of reputation and legal problems can seem high. Donors’ appetites for taking risks vary, but, in general, the need for risk avoidance seems higher when directly supporting local organizations than when using an INGO intermediary. Also, directly supporting local organizations is significantly more labor-intensive than funding well-established INGOs; local organizations require more hands-on assistance in developing work plans, budgeting, and monitoring and reporting results.

Donor efforts to increase local ownership have been largely ineffective. But donors remain keen to support local ownership. Indeed, USAID’s recently launched Journey to Self-Reliance initiative puts local ownership at the center of its development strategy. There is also no evidence to suggest that locally owned actions are more effective than donor-driven activities. Donors and others feel it is too early to fully appreciate local ownership’s potential. Donors’ promotion of local ownership can benefit from, first, rethinking what constitutes local ownership and, second, changing how they fund and relate to local organizations, which we discuss later.

**FROM CO-OWNERSHIP TO OWNERSHIP:** Many formerly donor-dependent countries gradually took ownership of their development programs as they grew economically. Some, such as South Korea, are now donor countries themselves. Unlike countries, NGOs lack the financial independence and organizational wherewithal to transition from donor-driven development activities to local ownership of development activities. For most, co-ownership will remain the model. In such instances donors and NGO recipients can mutually agree on priorities, what constitutes co-ownership, what each party will do to achieve co-ownership, and what indices will gauge progress.
CONCLUSIONS ON LOCAL OWNERSHIP

It is unrealistic to assume that local NGOs can take full ownership of their programs. After all, many decades-old INGOs remain donor-dependent. This does not mean that donors cannot give NGOs more control over how, and on what, funds are spent and help them develop capacities to compete for funding. Whether making NGOs more independent and organizationally strong should be a top priority for donors depends on whether their predominant mission is to improve a country’s health status or to promote a strong civil society.

IMPROVING HEALTH: If the donor’s aim is to improve the health of a country, there is no evidence that local ownership is superior to donor-driven approaches. It can be argued that lack of evidence reflects lack of experience rather than lack of effect. However, the extensive time and resources needed in these settings to test the benefits of local ownership could compromise the mission of improving health.

PROMOTING CIVIL SOCIETY: If the donor posits that countries with a strong civil society will be more democratic and, in the long run, more prosperous and healthier, then investing in local NGOs makes sense. This investment is starkly different from one designed to, say, reduce maternal mortality, and it requires different metrics to measure success. Metrics for accessing the strength of local NGOs would include such things as a clear mission statement, budgetary competence, a business model, and a human resource manual.

CO-OWNERSHIP: A more realistic and pragmatic option is some form of co-ownership, a partnership that builds on the expertise of local actors, addresses mutually agreed upon priorities, invests in organizational capacity, and defines the roles and responsibilities of the two parties. Such an arrangement (discussed below) could both improve health and promote civil society.

2. SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability, one of the desired outcomes of local ownership, is a mantra for donors. It is reasonable to assume that a development program is more likely to continue if the country owns it than if it is imposed by an external donor. For national governments sustainability is fairly straightforward: The government continues to support an activity through funding, personnel, political support, and promotion. However, country ownership is unrealistic for low-income countries such as Malawi and Uganda. As a group, low-income countries obtain half of their total health expenditures from external donors. With any reduction in donor funding, it is unlikely that low-income countries would be able to sustain donor-financed initiatives. Achieving local ownership and sustainability is also problematic in many lower-middle income countries, such as Kenya and Zambia. Other lower-middle income countries
(e.g., Nigeria and the Philippines) have the financial and human resources to take ownership of their development programs but lack the commitment. Countries that graduated from donor dependence and continued to support family planning were characterized by stable government, commitment to socio-economic development, a growing economy, and strong family planning programs. Few sub-Saharan African countries meet these criteria.

The sustainability of NGOs’ activities is more complex than that of governments. For NGOs there are three types of sustainability: organizational, advocacy activities, and results.

**ORGANIZATIONAL**: The financial well-being of NGOs, even INGOs, is perilous. With few exceptions, they do not have general support grants, reserve funds, or significant income. Some NGOs do have revenue from fees-for-services and sales of commodities, but this is insufficient to sustain non-service activities that do not generate income, such as advocacy and education. As a result, NGOs will always depend on donors to some degree. Financial sustainability is particularly challenging when the organization depends on just a few donors, has limited fundraising capacity, and lacks access to other donors.

**ADVOCACY**: Without continued dedicated funding, it is unreasonable to assume that financially vulnerable organizations will sustain advocacy activities. Local champions already committed to improving their country’s health status will most likely continue to be advocates, but they will lose the organized advocacy campaigns that NGOs build around them. There are, however, several ways that advocacy activities can continue beyond the end of an externally funded advocacy project:

1. **Partnership with government**: In the context of their FP2020 commitment, some national and local governments have taken ownership of advocacy efforts, including funding their operations. Government support of such things as district advocacy working groups means that advocacy activities will continue. It also means that they will reflect the government’s priorities and avoid issues that the government does not support, such as family planning services for unmarried youth.

2. **Piggybacking**: NGOs sometimes use resources from other projects to continue advocacy activities. However, funding advocacy from other projects will tend to skew the advocacy toward the objectives of those projects and not necessarily the country’s most important issues.

3. **Use of discretionary funds**: Some financially robust NGOs have used their limited discretionary funds to support advocacy activities. For most NGOs the scope and length of these activities is circumscribed by the modest size of their discretionary funds.

4. **New donors**: NGOs can seek new donors to continue their advocacy activities. The type of advocacy and its objectives will reflect the new donor’s priorities. Few advocacy NGOs have
received direct, ongoing support to sustain their core activities. However, the success of some NGOs (e.g., Amref Health Africa, African Women’s Development Fund, and African Population Health Research Centre) in obtaining donor support indicates that indigenous NGOs can compete with INGOs for donor funds for projects that include advocacy.

5. **Tie-off grants:** Occasionally, donors award grants to provide an end-of-project soft landing and give NGOs space and resources to find ways to sustain activities, including other funding.

**RESULTS:** It is unfortunate that there is minimal donor interest and funding to determine or understand how to sustain results. There are practically no funds to determine if actions and impacts generated by advocacy wins continue. Determining this post-project would be the first step to understanding why some advocacy efforts are sustained while others end. **Donors should invest more in understanding the sustainability of results.**

**CONCLUSIONS ON SUSTAINABILITY**

Although sustaining advocacy after funding ends is an aspiration among donors, it is unreasonable to expect post-project advocacy to continue at a comparable level of effort and direction. **If donors have priority objectives requiring ongoing advocacy, they need to make long-term investments and encourage other donors to make similar commitments.** There are non-advocacy precedents of donors coming together to make long-term investments in specific health areas—for example, GAVI, the Global Fund, and GAIN. A similar arrangement focusing on advocacy could sustain campaigns to promote family planning and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR). One possible model is the recently proposed Right to Health Capacity Fund, which would support NGO advocacy to improve rights-based health systems.⁹

At the end of a project, donors should expect the end or degradation of activities unless they support actions to increase the chances of sustainability. Project or tie-off grants could include funds to help the NGOs form partnerships with local governments and find new donors.
3. FUNDING MECHANISMS

Donors use a wide range of funding mechanisms. However, the alignment between types of grants and project objectives has been mixed. For example, a donor may aim to eliminate female genital cutting, an objective requiring many years, but fund only a three-year project to address the problem. Below are considerations and options that may help donors’ funding mechanisms better reflect their priorities:

1. LENGTH OF SUPPORT: Advocacy campaigns require long-term investment because some changes, e.g., gender equity, face significant socio-cultural and legal barriers and require a multi-year, multi-pronged campaign. Sustained advocacy is needed to maintain wins, e.g., annual budget support. Short-term rapid response grants are useful when a window of opportunity is identified and has a clear advocacy pathway, e.g., supporting a learning trip for policymakers.

2. OVERHEAD/INDIRECT COSTS: While donors want to increase the organizational capacity of NGOs, their low allowable indirect cost rates do not enable organizations to invest in non-project-specific areas vital for the organization’s future, such as hiring project development personnel. An analysis of US grantees found that around 50 percent were in financial stress as evidenced by having less than a month of operating reserves or running deficits.\textsuperscript{10} Based on anecdotal information, financial insecurity is much more common among developing-world NGOs.

3. CAPACITY-BUILDING GRANTS: Program or project grants are not the best way to build organizational capacity, even if donors become more generous with overhead rates or general support. Viewing capacity building as a byproduct of a larger project lowers its priority. If capacity building is the top priority, grants should address that purpose directly. If capacity building is a major secondary objective of a program grant, it should have milestones to track growth in organizational capacity.

4. FLEXIBILITY: Donors are inconsistent about how much flexibility they give NGOs to decide how and on what to spend funds. Since advocacy needs, both pro-active and defensive, are difficult to predict, giving NGOs spending latitude to respond quickly to the changing environment is important. Such freedom is also a part of local ownership.

5. STRATEGIC COORDINATION: Advocacy wins usually involve numerous organizations addressing a mutually agreed-upon advocacy opportunity. Less common are organizations strategically coordinating future activities that build on each other’s strengths. Indeed, typically, organizations do not have full knowledge of all the advocacy activities in their geographies. Support of a coordinating body and mechanism would reduce duplication and help create a critical mass for advocacy.
6. COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT: Competitive procurement is a daunting process for local NGOs inexperienced in responding to requests for applications. For INGOs competitive procurement is a labor-intensive, costly undertaking that distracts from their mission. Worse yet, the effort necessarily leads more often to failure than to success. Competitive procurement is also costly for donors, who must process multiple proposals to obtain one winner. A more efficient method is soliciting letters of interest from a well-known potential grantee or grantees. This approach, common among donors, works well when the donor knows the potential grantees but is more problematic with less well-known local NGOs. In either case, it is important to employ trusted, knowledgeable in-country people to identify potential grantees.

7. DIRECT VERSUS INDIRECT SUPPORT: As a practical matter, few donors have enough employees to execute and manage portfolios with a large number of grantees. Therefore, donors fund NGOs through intermediaries, often INGOs. These intermediaries typically provide technical assistance and oversight, assume fiduciary responsibilities of the subgrants, and serve as the subgrantees’ informational conduit to the donor.

Using INGOs as funding intermediaries has worked well and allowed larger donors to support many NGOs across numerous geographies. Still, with the desire to shift more funding and decision-making to the South, the desirability of this approach has come into question. Some question the efficiency and value-added of using expensive European or North American INGOs as intermediaries. Several alternative funding channels have been suggested:

   a. Southern intermediaries—This option retains an intermediary approach with a Southern NGO performing all the functions of a Northern INGO. A Southern NGO could be less expensive and would be closer to and more knowledgeable about problems and opportunities. This alternative would increase the perception and reality of local ownership. It would also usually require an initial investment to build-up the intermediary’s own capacity and recruit qualified staff.

   b. INGO spin-offs or subsidiaries—In a variation of the above, an INGO spin-off or subsidiary is the intermediary. These local organizations represent a range of sister organizations, spin-offs, subsidiaries, and associates with varying independence and could be up and running much quicker than a newborn Southern intermediary. The parent INGO’s role should be clear and minimal.

   c. Direct funding—Donors now directly fund Southern NGOs on a relatively small scale. Without additional staff oversight, the number of NGOs that could be directly funded is limited. If, however, a donor operated in a limited number of geographies and identified
a few, well-established NGOs or INGO subsidiaries, it could effectively increase direct support. Direct funding may require greater risk tolerance and changing some grant requirements, such as periodic progress reports.

d. South–North partnership—Many elements of local ownership could shift to the South while a Northern partner or partners provides technical support in areas where establishing strong capabilities will take time. Examples include M&E, data analysis, and communications. The International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) exemplifies some of these elements, with its London and regional offices providing a range of technical assistance and guidance to member associates.

8. Concentration of effort: To maximize return on investment and global impact, donors should strategically select a limited number of geographies and support a coordinated network of advocacy activities in those areas.

CONCLUSIONS ON GRANT-MAKING

To shift more budgetary control, priority setting, and implementation of advocacy campaigns to the South through a non-competitive process, donors should increase investment in capacity building indirectly, by raising indirect cost rates, or directly, by awarding capacity building grants. The length of grants should consider the time needed to build capacity and to achieve and sustain advocacy wins. Greater support for coordination and collaboration among advocacy organizations would increase effectiveness and efficiency. A South–North advocacy partnership would retain most of the positive elements of the INGO intermediary funding channel while expediting transfer of control to the South. This partnership should be restricted to a few large countries with potential for global impact.

4. OPTIONS FOR ADVOCACY INVESTMENTS

Collaborative partnerships between INGOs and local champions and organizations have mobilized domestic resources and improved policy and health care. This co-ownership of advocacy is a proven model that could be improved by strengthening the capacity of local NGOs.

Based on the literature review and consultations, donors should consider four options reflecting different investment aims:
1. If the aim is efficiency and specific results:

- Be selective in your choice of partners and sphere of influence (geographically or by issue). Successful advocacy in a country with a larger population will improve the lives of more people.
- Fund the organization that is most capable. Assess the attributes of INGOs, NGOs, and civil society partners that will deliver lasting results.
- Focus on taking an idea or advocacy effort to scale. Support innovative yet replicable approaches.

2. If the aim is longer-term impact on an issue and/or the democratic process:

- Commit multi-year support, tailored to self-identified grantee needs for flexibility, systems support, technical skills, and donor relations.
- Be adaptive as advocacy successes generate opposition.
- Build in room for adapting to new government leaders, shifts in donor and government funding and the political landscape.
- Make alliances with or fund complementary efforts that focus on government transparency, tax reforms and reducing corruption.

3. If the aim is to ensure that local leaders and civil society thrive and sustain their own advocacy:

- Trust and support local expertise.
- Support their ability to develop partnerships that connect them regionally and globally, navigate technical issues, and link them to proven approaches, evidence, trends, and, most importantly, other funding sources.
- Be more generous with general support, coverage of indirect costs, earmarked funds for a monitoring and learning agenda, communications, and mentorship.
- Increase tolerance for risk, reduce support requirements, remain open to local ideas and issues.

4. If the aim is to reduce the burden of grantee management and maximize impact:

- Go big: Partner with other donors to create a mechanism (e.g., the model investment mechanism below) with longevity and clear parameters for a focused advocacy effort.
- Work with proven intermediaries (e.g., PAI, Mannion Daniels) with a track record of successful partnerships and subawards.
- Fully support and connect Southern-led efforts and partnerships.
- Invest in a multiplier effect, finding and funding strategies common to different issues and places.
5. A MODEL INVESTMENT MECHANISM

While there is no ideal investment mechanism, we present a model here that includes the most important elements needed to advance and sustain a meaningful SRHR advocacy effort. We recommend that donors consider supporting a Global Advocacy Initiative (GAI) with three interrelated components:

1. **A global perspective**: GAI would facilitate strategic collaboration and direction of advocacy efforts. The initiative would have North-to-South, South-to-North, and South-to-South perspectives. It would ensure a timely and accurate flow of intelligence and information among advocates and organizations. It would also prioritize technical expertise in such areas as M&E, communication, and fundraising. GAI also would be a conduit for lessons learned and advocacy issues from the South to inform pro-active advocacy activities in the North and across and within regions. If GAI was used as the funding mechanism for regional hubs, it would provide fiduciary and programmatic oversight and efficiencies.

2. **Regional advocacy hubs**: Hubs would develop country and regional investment strategies, identify and fund local advocacy organizations, and facilitate country and regional coordination. Working with GAI, the hubs would provide a range of technical assistance, including capacity building. Over time, the hubs would take on more and more technical assistance responsibilities. Initially, three hubs could be established—in francophone Africa, East and West anglophone Africa, and South Asia, with a later addition of a hub in Southern Africa. Hubs could be both funded directly by donors and supported through GAI.

3. **Local networks**: GAI and advocacy hubs would work strategically with existing champions in individual countries to develop a network of local NGOs. Adequately resourced, these country networks would form the critical mass needed for long-term and proactive advocacy campaigns. These networks would lead all advocacy efforts, including the generation of evidence for advocacy within global policy arenas and the donor community. The primary function of GAI and the hubs would be nurturing and supporting these local networks.
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NOTES

1 This options brief builds on a literature review and 13 international and domestic consultations with 176 participants representing academia, donors, governments, and NGOs. The review of peer reviewed publications, gray literature, and official government documents yielded over 250 references, available here. The list of experts consulted is available here. This brief is the first in a series that will cover the need for advocacy, types of advocacy, and monitoring and evaluating advocacy.

2 Scores of national governments in South America, South-East Asia, and India have assumed ownership of programs as they advanced from low- to middle- and upper-middle income status. Sometimes this “graduation” occurred when the countries reached an economic benchmark making them ineligible for aid. In other instances aid was superfluous relative to the funding and programmatic resources of the host country. This topic is outside the scope of this brief, which concentrates on ownership in low income countries.

3 Office of Inspector General, USAID (March 21, 2019). Despite optimism about engaging local organizations, USAID had challenges determining impact and mitigating risks. Audit Report 5-000-19-001-P.

4 Office of Inspector General, USAID (December 12, 2007). Audit of USAID’s New Partners Initiative created under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. Audit Report No. 9-000-08-002-P.

5 Closing the loop on learning. A review of local solutions evaluation reports (December 2016). Washington, DC: USAID.


7 Examples of countries’ population programs graduated by USAID are Colombia, Mexico, Morocco, South Korea, Thailand, and Turkey.

